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errors are my own responsibility.Hold-Up, Stakeholders and Takeover Threats
Abstract: We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships be-
tween the target owners and other stakeholders. In the absence of takeovers, stakeholders’
bargaining power increases their incentive to invest but reduces the owners’ incentive to
invest. The threat of a takeover that would transfer value from the stakeholders reduces
their ex ante investment. However, the stakeholders may appropriate ex post some value
created by a takeover. This can prevent some value-enhancing takeovers. We examine
extensions to the disciplinary role of takeovers, takeover defence mechanisms, and trade
credit, and discuss empirical predictions. (JEL: G34)
Keywords: Takeovers, stakeholder, investment, hold-up, bargaining.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the costs and bene￿ts of an active market for corporate con-
trol have been hotly debated. Most ￿nance scholars argue that takeover activity is
accompanied by operating and ￿nancial synergies, improved managerial discipline, more
￿exibility in internal capital markets, and a greater use of tax gains. Others argue that
takeover threats lead managers to make myopic investment decisions, lead ￿rms to su￿er
disadvantages from corporate diversi￿cation, and prevent ￿rms from entering implicit
contracts with workers.1 This paper reexamines the merits of the market for corporate
control in a framework that embeds explicitly strategic interactions among stakeholders.
We focus on the long-term interactions among an incumbent manager, a potential
acquirer, and a long-term stakeholder.2 We identify two con￿icting e￿ects: On the one
hand, takeovers that are expected to hurt particular stakeholders will reduce their ex
ante investment in the ￿rm. On the other hand, where stakeholders stand to gain from
a takeover (by appropriating a fraction of the value created), value-increasing takeovers
may not take place. We discuss our results in light of existing empirical evidence, and we
provide further empirical predictions about the e￿ect of the possibility of a takeover on
trading partners (including trade creditors) and workers. In particular, we suggest that
stakeholder theories may be better tested on stakeholders other than workers because the
relationship of the ￿rm with these other stakeholders involve fewer outside contingencies
1See among many others, Grinblatt and Titman (2001, ch. 20), Jensen (1988), Morck et al (1990),
Scherer (1988), Shleifer and Summers (1988), and Stein (1988).
2At least three types of such stakeholders, apart from owners, can be a￿ected by the possibility of
a takeover: Debtholders, trading partners, and insiders, including managers and workers. A takeover
can have many e￿ects on these stakeholders, and the prospect of a takeover can alter the terms of the
relationships among them. For instance, a takeover that leads to a change in capital structure will
impact creditors. The prospect of a takeover threat will therefore a￿ect the interest rate that creditors
require. The takeover may also a￿ect the company’s market power and future supply contracts. The
level of relationship-speci￿c investment undertaken by the trading partners will also depend on the
possibility of a takeover. The level of ￿rm-speci￿c investment made by workers, be it e￿ort or temporary
wage concessions, will also depend on the possibility of a takeover and the potential impact on future
wage negotiations. To date, the existing literature on takeovers and stakeholders has focused on labor
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988, Ponti￿ et al, 1990, and Rosett, 1990). By incorporating a more general
set of stakeholders, we are able to provide a framework that integrates scattered theories of the real
e￿ects of takeover activity.
3than its relationship with workers.
Our approach to a theory of takeover threats and stakeholder relationships draws on
insights found in the literature on incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem.3 For
simplicity, we ￿rst deliberately focus on a situation where a project depends primarily
on a single stakeholder’s investment, and where the only other investment is the costly
takeover made by the bidder. We consider the special case where an entrepreneur runs a
project whose future returns increase as the stakeholder exerts more e￿ort. We suppose
that this long-term relationship is governed by a sequence of short-term contracts. With
long-term contracts ruled out, the expected negotiation of future short-term contracts
a￿ects ex ante investments. We start with the benchmark world of no takeovers. In this
world, the entrepreneur may be better o￿ ex ante with low ex post bargaining power: The
stakeholder’s bargaining power enhances his investment, as he expects to bene￿t more
from this investment in future negotiations. In Section 5, we allow the entrepreneur to
invest, and the stakeholder’s investment is interpreted as ￿nancing the entrepreneur’s
investment. Then, as the stakeholder’s bargaining power increases, the entrepreneur’s
￿nancial constraint is relaxed, but his incentive to invest is lower.4;5
3The hold-up problem arises when a party who privately incurs the cost of an investment, but only
obtains a fraction of the return generated by this investment, is thus led to underinvest. The analysis of
this problem has been a popular proxy for transaction costs in modern theories of the ￿rm (see, among
many others, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Tirole (1999)), as well as in the theoretical analysis of
industrial relations (Grout (1984)).
4If the stakeholder’s bargaining power is too high, then the entrepreneur is induced to underinvest.
There is a tradeo￿ (from both the entrepreneur’s and the social point of view) between the increased cost
restricting the ￿rm’s incentive to invest and the bene￿ts of a higher investment from the stakeholder.
For example, we suggest that German unions’ power induces them to agree on substantial real wage
concessions in bad times (Layard et al (1991)) because they are con￿dent they can secure bene￿ts in
future good times. This, however, comes at the cost of higher labor costs and a reduced incentive to
invest from the ￿rm’s viewpoint, which has already been emphasized (Baldwin (1983), Bronars and
Deere (1993a, 1993b) and Grout (1984)).
5More generally, the idea that a principal may bene￿t from giving power to an agent has recently
received substantial attention. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that to delegate authority may foster
the agent’s initiative. Dispersed ownership can commit shareholders to free ride and not to acquire
information which may be used to overrule a manager (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)), and not
to renege upon the promises of deferred compensation to managers or workers (Habib (1997)). The
manager and workers’ e￿orts thus decrease as the ownerhip becomes more dispersed. Our analysis
focuses on the e￿ects of expected bargaining outcomes (rather than those of authority or free riding
from shareholders) on several aspects of economic activity
4These results are dramatically altered by the possibility of takeovers. In our setup,
costly takeovers are made by acquirers with two characteristics: (1) They may, or may
not, increase the ￿rm’s value, and (2) they may provide the acquirer with a higher
fraction of the surplus created when bargaining with the stakeholder. When only the
wealth transfer characteristics matter, implicit contracts are constrained by the possibil-
ity of takeovers which are aimed at accruing gains to the acquirer at the expense of the
stakeholder. Once the investments are sunk, a tougher acquirer would earn more when
bargaining than would the incumbent entrepreneur. This gives the acquirer an incentive
to take over the ￿rm. The takeover also a￿ects the amount that the stakeholder expects
to obtain from future negotiations, and hence his investment. Two possible cases can
arise: Either the stakeholder prevents the takeover by restricting his investment to a
level that leaves the rent to the acquirer below the takeover cost; or he accommodates
the takeover and he restricts his investment to a level that is compatible with the tough
acquirer running the ￿rm. Furthermore, under the threat of a takeover, the stakeholder’s
investment may decrease with his bargaining power: When the stakeholder’s bargain-
ing power increases, the rent that the acquirer can obtain from taking over the ￿rm
increases as well for a given level of investment. When the stakeholder wants to pre-
vent the takeover, he reduces his investment to leave the rent below the takeover cost.
Hence, the limit on the investment that prevents the takeover becomes higher as the
stakeholder’s bargaining power decreases.
However, potential acquirers often create rather than transfer value. The market for
corporate control allocates shares to those who value them most highly. Value creation
by the acquirer has two e￿ects: First, it alleviates this underinvestment problem to the
extent that it increases the payo￿ to the stakeholder who obtains a (smaller) fraction of a
larger pie. Second, this increase may be so high that it discourages the bidder from taking
over the ￿rm. The stakeholder appropriates a fraction of the value created by a value
increasing takeover, while the acquirer bears the full takeover cost. This may actually
reduce the likelihood of a value-increasing takeover, and thus back￿re on the stakeholder
5who then su￿ers from his inability to commit not to extract rents. In other words, there
is a bilateral hold-up problem, where the value created by the stakeholder’s investment
and the bidder’s acquisition is constrained by the fact that each party appropriates a
fraction of the value created by the other.
The argument that the gains in hostile takeovers may derive from the breach of
implicit contracts in the target ￿rm has been discussed in Shleifer and Summers’ (1988)
seminal paper.6 However, the authors do not model ex-ante investment, and they focus
on the wealth transfer hypothesis. In contrast, we analyze how value-creation alters
wealth transfer and ex ante incentives, and we examine the impact of stakeholders’
actions on takeover activity in a simple model which can be built upon. Although
the literature on takeovers has evolved around the problem created by the free-riding
behavior of small shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980), i.e. the hold-up problem
that they create by appropriating the value created by a bidder and by discouraging him
from taking over target ￿rms, we emphasize that similar problems may originate from
other stakeholders as well. This allows us to shed light on a number of issues and to
derive further empirical predictions.
To date, the most popular proxies used to analyze the e￿ect of takeovers on stakehold-
ers have been wages, adjustments in the labor force and the behavior of unions during or
before the takeover process. Most existing studies have documented that workers have
incurred losses after takeovers. Among others, Rosett (1990) ￿nds that a wealth transfer
from workers to shareholders accounts for 10% of the hostile takeover premium within
18 years after the takeover, and 5% for friendly takeovers. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989)
￿nd that after takeovers ￿rms tend to cut the labor force in central o￿ces.7 Ponti￿ et
6Their argument relies on the idea that the incumbent managers are committed to respect implicit
contracts with workers, and that the bidder must sack the managers in a so-called hostile takeover to
renege on the implicit contracts. We suggest that the analysis of a three-tier hierarchy could lead to
the result that friendly takeovers may also lead to a breach of trust. This is consistent with empirical
studies (Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989), Rosett (1990)).
7The business press is replete with examples of unions acting strategically with raiders. For example,
in the US airline industry, the tough raider Lorenzo repeatedly failed to obtain wage concessions and
good service from the workers of the airlines companies he took over. After Lorenzo’s raids on TWA in
1985 and Eastern Airlines in 1986, the unions not only refused to make concessions, but also looked for a
6al (1990) ￿nd that pension funds were reverted by 15.1% of acquirers in the two years
following hostile takeovers, but only by 8.4% of acquirers within two years of friendly
takeovers, and that reversions amounted on average to about 11% of the takeover pre-
mium. In addition, Warga and Welch (1993) and Asquith and Wizman (1993) document
that in LBOs bondholder losses account for a statistically signi￿cant fraction of takeover
premia. Asquith and Wizman also ￿nd that bondholders with strong covenant protec-
tion gain from LBOs. This can be interpreted as coinsurance, whereby LBOs make these
secured bonds more secure or, equivalently, as bondholders’ sharing of synergy gains. To
date, little work has been done on either the impact of takeovers on trading partners, or
the implicit contract hypothesis, i.e. the ex ante e￿ect of an active market for corporate
control on relationships with stakeholders.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the e￿ect of future negotiations
on the stakeholder’s e￿ort. Section 4 analyzes the impact of takeovers and takeover
defence mechanisms on e￿ort and on how e￿ort varies with bargaining power. Section 5
discusses how our analysis relates to the literature on the disciplinary role of takeovers,
and it develops an extension to trade credit and its interactions with the market for
corporate control. Section 5 also discusses a number of empirical predictions on the
e￿ect of takeovers on trade credit. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
Appendix in section 7.
white knight. They promised substantial wage concessions in exchange for the white knight overbidding
Lorenzo. This succeeded for TWA where Icahn was o￿ered 300 million dollars by the unions and, as
a result, could overbid Lorenzo and ￿nally bought the ￿rm. The strategy failed for Eastern Airlines
however, when Lorenzo demanded an unacceptable price. Later on, the Lorenzo empire collapsed (see
Bernstein (1990)). Interestingly, although he was not as tough as Lorenzo, Icahn was far from being
considered as a manager who accommodated unions. In this paper, we point out that for a given amount
of wage concessions only a hard-nosed manager could act credibly as a white knight.
72 The Model
2.1 The Firm and the Stakeholder
An entrepreneur E wants to undertake a two-stage project. The project requires an
action from a stakeholder in stage 1. The stakeholder’s action is a non-contractible and
￿rm-speci￿c e￿ort e ￿ 0 at cost c(e) = e. In addition, denote wt the stage t 2 f1;2g
price he obtains for his action. Let w0 be the stakeholder’s outside opportunity price in
each stage.
Although the analysis holds for di￿erent types of shareholders, it is convenient to
think of the e￿ort as being provided by an input supplier. This re￿ects the stakeholder’s
willingness to work for a low w1 before the ￿rm generates its output in the hope of being
compensated after the output is realized.8 For simplicity, we assume that the input
market in stage 1 is perfectly competitive, and that the stakeholder has unlimited access
to capital.
Under the incumbent entrepreneur, the project generates a return R(e) in stage 2.
We assume that R is twice di￿erentiable with R0 > 0; R00 < 0 and R0(0) = +1. For
convenience, we set f(e) = R(e)￿w0 and assume that f(0) = 0. The project is pro￿table,
i.e. 9e; R(e) ￿ 2w0 + e. The entrepreneur’s objective function is ￿ = R(e) ￿ w1 ￿ w2
and the stakeholder’s is w1 +w2 ￿e. For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate is
zero.
Assumption 1 : Long term contracts are not feasible.
This assumption has been discussed at length in previous papers. For instance, it can
be justi￿ed by arguing that the number of contingencies to be included in a long term
contract would be either prohibitively costly or impossible to describe (Grossman and
Hart, 1986, Tirole, 1999). An alternative explanation is that accounting manipulations
are possible in order to hide pro￿ts, but that they can occur only before the e￿ort is
made (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).
8All our results concerning the price ￿exibility also hold if it is de￿ned as w0 ￿ w1.
8Assumption 2 : The stage 2 bargaining game proceeds as follows: a take-it-or-leave-it
o￿er is made by the entrepreneur with probability p and by the stakeholder with probability
(1 ￿ p). We call p the (publicly observable) entrepreneur’s bargaining power.
Several factors may a￿ect bargaining power. For instance, when there are several
stakeholders represented by a union, the union’s bargaining power is likely to increase
with the number of stakeholders; more representation brings more dues which can be
spent on negotiating, looking for outside options, ￿nancing industrial actions, etc. It
may also commit more stakeholders to the actions decided by the union. In addition,
bargaining power can re￿ect characteristics of the production technology and/or the
nature of the e￿ort. For instance, the entrepreneur’s bargaining power is likely to be
low when the stakeholder hired in stage 1 is crucial for the realization of the return and
when his e￿ort is an investment which other ￿rms value. The stakeholder’s bargaining
power in period 2 re￿ects the idea that the stakeholder is important in producing the
output even after investing. The entrepreneur’s bargaining power depends on her skills
and the production technology.9 The bargaining power may also be a￿ected by the
concentration in ownership structure or the delegation of control: for instance, if the
entrepreneur is the most important shareholder of the ￿rm, she is more willing to spend
time and e￿ort in haggling when her share is large.10 Next, the di￿erent pricing or
bargaining strategy subsequent to a takeover could be captured by modelling the idea
that a takeover increases market power, whether it is a horizontal (Kim and Singal, 1993)
or a vertical merger (Chemla, 2003).
9The entrepreneur’s monitoring and/or production technologies may make him more or less depen-
dent on the initial stakeholder. For instance, the entrepreneur may learn how to perform a number of
productive and monitoring tasks. Since she will not be able to perform the tasks she did not learn, not to
learn some tasks is a commitment to delegate. The stakeholder will observe what tasks the entrepreneur
can perform, what tasks will be delegated to him and thus how necessary he is likely to be.
10In this case, we shall see that as in Habib (1997) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), the
entrepreneur may wish to be a small shareholder because this commits him not to spend much on
haggling. However, we shall keep the bargaining power exogenous.
92.2 The Acquirer
After the stage 1 e￿ort is exerted, but before the return is made veri￿able, a potential
acquirer A decides whether or not to acquire the ￿rm. A di￿ers from the incumbent
entrepreneur E in two respects.
￿ His bargaining power is q > p. An entrepreneur’s type is common knowledge
and can be viewed as a reputation that the entrepreneurs cannot manipulate.11
For instance, this higher bargaining power may re￿ect the idea that takeovers
are accompanied by a higher power on the product market, reducing the scope
for attractive outside options for the stakeholder (Kim and Singal (1993), Chemla
(2003)). It may also re￿ect higher concentration in ownership structure and a more
rigorous management (see Habib (1997) and Jarrell et al (1988)).
￿ The stage 2 return under the potential acquirer is ~ ￿R, where ~ ￿ is an observable,
but not veri￿able, random variable which is realized at the end of stage 1. In
other words, A’s valuation di￿ers’ from E’s and is not known in advance. For
convenience, ~ ￿ is uniformly distributed on [￿; ￿ ￿] with 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 + C
R(e) ￿ ￿ ￿.12
In addition to the cost of acquiring shares, the acquirer needs to bear a ￿xed cost C
to take over the ￿rm. We say that a takeover is (ex post) value increasing (resp. value
decreasing) when the realization ￿ of ~ ￿ satis￿es (resp. violates) ￿R(e) ￿ C > R(e), i.e.
￿ > ￿V ￿ 1 + C
R(e). Note that this de￿nition re￿ects the increase in value at the time of
the takeover, but not the impact of the takeover on ex ante investment. Hence, it is not
an appropriate proxy to analyze the welfare impact of takeovers in our model.
How the surplus is shared between the acquirer and the incumbent entrepreneur does
not a￿ect the analysis. However, the empirical evidence that the stock prices of acquired
11For instance, their behavior depends on education and values taught to them earlier and which may
be very costly to manipulate (Akerlof (1983)). Similarly, one might think that people acquire and use
some skills and that new skills a￿ecting their bargaining power are too costly or too long to acquire.
12This speci￿cation ensures that the acquirer bene￿ts from the stakeholder’s investment. Section 5
discusses the general case where the surplus generated under the acquirer is a function S(e):
10￿rms increase much more than those of acquiring ￿rms suggests that the incumbent
entrepreneur should have a large bargaining power.
2.3 The Timing
To sum up, the sequence of events is as follows:
￿ In stage 1, the stakeholder is hired via a contract which speci￿es a payment w1.
He exerts an e￿ort e ￿ 0 at cost c(e) = e and is paid w1. Then, ~ ￿ is realized and
the potential acquirer A decides to whether or not take over the ￿rm.
￿ In stage 2, the two parties bargain over a payment w2 and sign a contract. Finally,
a return R(e) is generated and the stakeholder receives w2.
3 The Impact of Negotiation on the Stakeholder’s
Investment
In this section, we assume away takeovers, i.e. C = +1. The ￿rm can only realize a
return R(e) under the incumbent entrepreneur. However, signing in stage 1 a contract
contingent on the e￿ort or on the second period pro￿t is assumed to be either impossible
or too costly. For a high level of e￿ort to be chosen, the parties have to rely on self-
enforcing contracts. For example, paying the stakeholder ex ante so that he makes an
e￿ort is not self-enforcing since he could take the money and leave the ￿rm or shirk.
What makes the agreement self-enforcing here is that the entrepreneur has to reward the
stakeholder after the latter exerts his e￿ort to realize a pro￿t.
We proceed by backward induction and ￿rst derive w2. With probability p, the
entrepreneur o￿ers w2 = w0 to the stakeholder who does not bene￿t from his e￿ort.
With probability 1 ￿ p, the stakeholder o￿ers w2 = R(e) and appropriates the whole
surplus. Hence, in expected terms, (E)w2 is given by
w2 = w0 + (1 ￿ p)f(e): (1)
11In equilibrium, the stakeholder exerts
e
￿￿ = argmax









This e￿ort is lower than the ￿rst best level of e￿ort e￿ which maximizes f(e)￿e, i.e.
such that f0(e￿) = 1, that the entrepreneur could obtain via an incentive contract signed
in stage 1 if complete long-term contracts were feasible. There is underprovision of e￿ort
with respect to the ￿rst best as soon as the entrepreneur’s bargaining power is strictly
positive.13 The stakeholder’s individual rationality (IR) constraint can be written
w1 + w2(e
￿￿) ￿ 2w0 + e
￿￿: (4)
Since the initial input market is perfectly competitive, this constraint is binding.
Therefore, the initial payment is w1 = 2w0 +e￿￿ ￿w2 ￿ w0 +e￿￿ (with equality only for
e = 0). The stakeholder expects to enjoy rents in stage 2 and is ready to work at a low
payment in stage 1.
In addition, the competitive initial input market enables the entrepreneur to appro-
priate all the rents ex ante so that her payo￿ coincides with the total surplus. It is
an increasing function of the e￿ort up to the ￿rst best e￿ort level and we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 1 : The stakeholder’s e￿ort and the entrepreneur’s payo￿ all decline in p.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
13Allowing the stakeholder to buy the ￿rm at the initial stage would solve this underinvestment
problem. In our setting, the entrepreneur has a unique access to the technology that makes it possible
to take the project. Hence, the stakeholder cannot buy the ￿rm.
12e￿￿ and w1 are constrained by the entrepreneur’s inability to commit to a high w2.
For instance, if the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, she cannot commit in
stage 1 to w2 greater than w0. Thus, the stakeholder does not accept a payment w1
lower than w0 and has no incentive to exert e￿ort. In contrast, the ￿rst best obtains
when p = 0 because the stakeholder is the residual claimant. Low bargaining power
enables the entrepreneur to commit to a high w2. A higher bargaining power increases
the stakeholder’s marginal revenue and hence his provision of e￿ort.14
It should be noted that in our setting, the contractual solutions to the hold-up prob-
lem developed in earlier papers do not apply. In particular, MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993) assume a rich enough veri￿able partition of the set of the states of nature that is
ruled out in our setting, while Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and
Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) assume that a default trade option is contractible, which en-
ables the parties to constrain renegotiation in order to elicit e￿cient investments. These
assumptions are ruled out in our model.
4 Takeovers and Implicit Contracts
In this section, we introduce the possibility of takeovers. We thus assume C < 1:
We shall consider the variables to be functions of the entrepreneur’s bargaining power:
e(p) = e￿￿(p), f[p] = f(e(p)), w1[p], w2[p].
To clarify the exposition, we ￿rst only allow takeovers that transfer value. We show
that the acquirer’s superior bargaining power reduces the stakeholder’s investment, and
that the stakeholder’s investment does not necessarily increase with his initial bargaining
power.
We then consider the possibility that takeovers create value. We show that value-
decreasing takeovers that are motivated by wealth transfers may take place, and that
14Similarly, for a given p, the e￿ort increases with the marginal return on e￿ort R0(￿). This suggests
that the degree of competition in the product market should a￿ect the impact of bargaining on the
stakeholder’s e￿ort. For instance, if an increase in competition decreases the marginal return on e￿ort,
it also decreases the importance of stakeholder power.
13there is a hold-up problem from the acquirer’s perspective, as the stakeholder appro-
priates some of the value created by the takeover. We show that the stakeholder may
bene￿t from takeovers, and that this bene￿t may be so high that it may discourage the
bidder from taking over the ￿rm. As a consequence, a stakeholder may su￿er from his
inability to commit to not appropriate some of the value created by the takeover during
later negotiations.
4.1 The Impact of Wealth Transfers on E￿ciency:
In this subsection, we ￿rst introduce the possibility of a takeover by an acquirer who
would not a￿ect the management of the ￿rm except for bargaining with the stakeholder.
In other words, the same return, R(e), is realized under either E or A , but A has higher
bargaining power with the stakeholder: ￿ = ￿ ￿ = 1.15 This takeover would be value-
decreasing since the acquirer would have to incur a cost C without creating any surplus.
We analyze the impact of the threat of such a takeover on the stakeholder’s e￿ort. We
show that the threat of takeovers whose main motive is to reduce payments to the
stakeholder prevents the entrepreneur from committing to some implicit contracts. Such
a takeover threat can induce the stakeholder to underinvest and lower the total surplus
and the entrepreneur’s pro￿t. Furthermore, we show that the stakeholder’s e￿ort may
decrease with his initial bargaining power.
Proposition 2 : When C ￿ (q ￿ p)f[p], the threat of a takeover which would be purely
wealth redistributive reduces both the stakeholder’s e￿ort and the total surplus. There
exists e < e(q) such that:
1. If (q ￿ p)f(e) ￿ C < (q ￿ p)f[p], then the stakeholder exerts the e￿ort satisfying
(q ￿ p)f(e) = C and there is no takeover. The stakeholder’s e￿ort and the total
surplus increase with p.
15If acquirers with a continuum of bargaining powers could take over the ￿rm before the stakeholder
is hired, the takeover would be led by the acquirer maximizing the value of the ￿rm. This would be
desirable if and only if the total surplus under the acquirer’s bargaining power was higher than that
under the incumbent entrepreneur.
142. If C < (q ￿ p)f(e), then the e￿ort is e(q) and the takeover takes place.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
The e￿ort is restricted by the mere threat of a takeover. The only incentive for A to
take over the ￿rm is to breach implicit contracts. When the e￿ort is high, the return and
the incentive to breach implicit contracts are high. Thus, the stakeholder may exert an
e￿ort that is low enough to prevent the takeover, i.e., choose ^ e such that C = (q￿p)f(^ e).
This implies that an increase in the incumbent entrepreneur’s bargaining power re-
duces the incentive for a acquirer to take over the ￿rm to gain from a lower w2. Thus, as
the entrepreneur’s bargaining power increases, the stakeholder can exert a higher e￿ort
while still preventing the takeover. Therefore, when the stakeholder restricts his e￿ort
in order to discourage a takeover, the stakeholder’s e￿ort decreases with his bargaining
power.
The stakeholder is not always better o￿ reducing his e￿ort to prevent the takeover.
When this strategic e￿ort reduces the pie too much, he is better o￿ enlarging the pie,
i.e., exerting e(q), and negotiating with A. However, he may be ready to reduce the pie
below that under A to keep a larger share: we may observe a lower e￿ort under the
threat of a takeover by A than e(q).
In sum, the stakeholder’s e￿ort is not monotonic in the entrepreneur’s bargaining
power: As p increases from 0 to 1, the e￿ort (and, hence, the total surplus) ￿rst decreases
in the range where there are takeovers, then increases in the range where there are
takeover threats, and ￿nally decreases again when the takeover cost is so high that there
is no takeover threat. E￿ort is maximized for the smallest bargaining power such that
the ￿rm is not the subject of a takeover threat.
The discussion above implies that when the takeover is purely wealth redistribu-
tive and when its threat creates a hold-up problem with stakeholders, takeover defence
mechanisms (TDM) may be desirable. TDMs can either increase the takeover cost (e.g.
a poison pill or the obligation to declare a toehold even lower than what is required
15by legislation) or confer the stakeholder the ability to prevent a takeover. This can be
achieved either by voting or veto rights in the directory board (as in Germany for unions)
or blockholdings such as either ESOPs or suppliers’ blocks of shares in continental Euro-
pean countries and in a Japanese keiretsu.16 In this subsection, both types of TDMs are
equivalent; they both prevent the takeover. Since the takeover is purely redistributive,
both systems ensure that there is no breach of implicit contracts and that there is no
takeover. Both of them lead to higher levels of e￿ort, more surplus and a higher payo￿
for the incumbent entrepreneur when the initial input market is perfect. 17
4.2 Wealth Transfer versus Value Creation
We now address the case where the entrepreneur and the acquirer also di￿er in their
ability to run the ￿rm. The acquirer’s valuation in stage 1 is ~ ￿R, where ~ ￿ is an observable,
but not veri￿able, random variable, which is uniformly distributed on [￿; ￿ ￿] with 0 <
￿ < 1 < ￿ ￿, and which is realized at the end of stage 1.





C + (q ￿ p)w0
qR(e)
￿ ￿A: (5)
In particular, ￿A ￿ ￿V if and only if q ￿
pf(e)+C
f(e)+C . In that case, the acquirer bene￿ts from
the wealth transfer but he only appropriates a fraction of the increase in value. When q
is high, he bene￿ts a lot from the wealth transfer, and the hold-up from the stakeholder
is limited. Hence, q must be high enough for the acquirer to have an incentive to take
over the ￿rm that is excessive in terms of total payo￿.
After a takeover, w2 = w0 + (1 ￿ q)(￿R(e) ￿ w0) instead of w0 + (1 ￿ p)f(e). If




(1￿q)R(e), w2 is higher than under the incumbent entrepreneur and the
16Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994), Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) and Gordon and Pound (1990) doc-
ument that ESOPs decrease the likelihood of takeovers. Note that TDMs at the discretion of the
entrepreneur would not help because the entrepreneur could not commit to prevent a takeover bene￿cial
to him if he had discretion over the takeover cost.
17It should be noted that TDM and veto rights have option-like features. This implies that the way
they alleviate the hold-up problem resembles that in, and can be seen as a real life equivalent of, Noldeke
and Schmidt (1995). They di￿er mostly in that they are not an option to trade.
16stakeholder pro￿ts from the takeover. Otherwise, w2 is lower than it would be absent
the takeover. As in the previous section, the stakeholder may either restrict his e￿ort
to prevent the takeover or accommodate the takeover. The acquirer only has a stronger
incentive for taking over the ￿rm than the stakeholder if q is high and p is low, because
he can then bene￿t from a su￿ciently high fraction of the value creation and potentially
from some wealth transfer. In particular, if q <
pf(e)+C
f(e)+C , ￿S < ￿A. Hence, there may be
values of ￿ for which the stakeholder would welcome the takeover, but the acquirer does
not want to take over the ￿rm. We thus obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 : If (1 ￿ q)C < (q ￿ p)f(e), then ￿A < ￿V < ￿S, i.e. value decreasing
takeovers may take place in order to bene￿t from a wealth transfer, or the stakeholder may
restrict his e￿ort to prevent the takeover. If (1￿q)C ￿ (q￿p)f(e), then ￿S ￿ ￿V ￿ ￿A,
i.e. value increasing takeovers may not take place because the acquirer would bear all the
cost of the takeover while he would appropriate only a fraction of the increase in value.
If the wealth transfer is higher than the hold-up from the stakeholder, a takeover must
increase value substantially to not reduce w2. If the hold-up from the stakeholder is more
important than the transfer of wealth to the acquirer, only takeovers which create enough
value will take place and there is no wealth transfer. The latter problem is actually all
the more acute as q and f(e) are small and p is large. This e￿ect also makes all parties
better o￿ with an entrepreneur whose bargaining power is high enough.18
These two e￿ects exactly o￿set each other when p =
q[C+f(e)]￿C
f(e) : With this value of
p, the acquirer and the stakeholder would both prefer the ￿rst best level of takeover
activity. In particular, the tougher the potential acquirer, the more acute the wealth
transfer is likely to be, and the higher the bargaining power of the entrepreneur which
18Since the stakeholder cannot prevent a takeover which would transfer wealth, he cannot obtain a
transfer from the acquirer before the takeover. On the other hand, an e￿cient negotiation between the
stakeholder and the acquirer would actually solve the latter problem. The stakeholder may promise a
payment to the acquirer to induce him to takeover the ￿rm, but asymmetric information (Fudenberg and
Tirole (1983)) and commitment problems may impede e￿cient bargaining. Other takeover facilitating
mechanisms like the existence of active risk arbitrageurs and the ability to buy toeholds anonymously
would also help.
17maximizes the value of the ￿rm. This value of p also maximizes ex ante investment and
thus the value of the ￿rm at the beginning of the game.
What e￿ect do these results have on stakeholder’s e￿ort? The possibility of some
ex post value increasing takeovers leading to a higher w2 increases the e￿ort ex ante
and so the value of the ￿rm. But the inability to commit to not transfer wealth from
the stakeholder in some either value-increasing or value-decreasing takeovers leads the
stakeholder to underinvest. At the time he exerts the e￿ort, the stakeholder expects a
payment of
w2 = w0 +
(1 ￿ p)
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An appropriate takeover defence mechanism would allow all value-increasing takeovers
to occur at the end of stage 1 while preventing the ￿rm from transferring wealth from
stakeholders after a potential takeover to ensure an appropriate level of e￿ort ex ante.
A traditional anti-takeover mechanism (which increases the takeover cost) would not
only prevent value-decreasing takeovers, but it would have to also prevent some value-
increasing takeovers to ensure that there is no transfer wealth from the stakeholder.
We thus obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4 : (1) A TDM increasing the takeover cost cannot allow all value increas-
ing takeovers and ensure that there is no wealth transfer. (2) If (1 ￿ q)C < (q ￿ p)f(e);
giving the stakeholder a veto right on the sale of the ￿rm prevents wealth transfers, allows
all desirable takeovers, and leads to a higher stakeholder’s e￿ort than any TDM increas-
ing the takeover cost. (3) If (1 ￿ q)C > (q ￿ p)f(e); the ￿rm does not bene￿t from an
anti-takeover device.
Proof: See Appendix 2
The intuition behind this result is simple. When C is low enough to allow all possible
value increasing takeovers to occur, some of them can breach implicit contracts. On the
18other hand, when C is high enough to protect the implicit contracts, a value increasing
takeover may be prevented. A could buy the ￿rm, pay C and breach implicit contracts
for some realizations of ~ ￿ and could be prevented from buying the ￿rm for others. C
should depend on A’s valuation, but that is impossible since ~ ￿ is not contractible. Thus,
a takeover cost C induces ine￿ciencies.
In contrast, the veto right enables the stakeholder to react ex post and its exercise
will depend on the acquirer’s valuation and the e￿ect of the takeover on the stakeholder’s
payo￿.19 With a veto right, there is no breach of implicit contracts and the takeovers
which take place are exactly the desirable ones. It should be noted, however, that such
veto rights may come with costs if bargaining between the acquirer and the stakeholder
is ine￿cient, or if the stakeholder obtains some rents that have a real e￿ect on the ￿rm’s
activity. This may explain why stakeholders are not always granted veto rights.
5 Applications and Extensions
We now discuss two applications and extensions: We examine how a disciplinary role of
takeovers can be embedded into our model, and we extend our analysis to trade credit.
We examine a number of empirical predictions on vertical relationships and trade credit.
5.1 The Surplus Created by the Acquirer and Disciplinary Takeovers
In our setup, the value transfer in takeovers had a negative impact on the stakeholder’s
investment while value creation provided better incentives. In this section, we discuss
how our model could be extended to include the argument that the threat of takeovers
discipline stakeholders.
The reasoning behind the disciplinary takeover argument is that poor performance
will prompt bidders to take over the ￿rm, which will lead to a loss for the stakeholder
19In practice, veto rights can take a variety of forms, ranging from the power that minority shareholders
can have in presence of supermajority rules to golden shares such as those that governments sometimes
keep following privatization.
19that did not perform well. Since the stakeholder anticipates this, the threat of a takeover
provides him with incentives to create value.
This argument relies on the assumption that poor performance associated with low
stakeholder’s investment increases the probability of a takeover which is costly to the
stakeholder. So far, this e￿ect of takeovers did not arise in this paper because low
investment also reduced the value under the acquirer, and so even more than the value
under the entrepreneur when the takeover created value.
To see how this result is a￿ected by a more general surplus function under the ac-
quirer, assume that the surplus created under the acquirer is ~ S(e) rather than ￿R(e):
The takeover creates value if the realization satis￿es S(e) ￿ C > R(e): It takes place
if qS(e) ￿ C > pR(e) + (q ￿ p)w0, and the stakeholder bene￿ts if (1 ￿ q)S(e) >
(1 ￿ p)R(e) ￿ (q ￿ p)w0:
The change in stakeholder wealth following a takeover can either increase or decrease
with the investment. Intuitively, the change in stakeholder wealth is more likely to be
increasing in e when the acquirer plans to build upon the ￿rm’s existing strength and
expertise, while it may decrease in e when the acquirer plans to change signi￿cantly the
corporate strategy.
In the latter case, the acquirer would only takeover the ￿rm if e￿ort is so low that
a lot of value could be created following the acquisition. If the stakeholder expects to
lose from the takeover, we are back to a setting that is similar to papers on disciplinary
takeovers (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980), whereby the threat of a takeover provides the
stakeholder with incentives to create value. However, when the surplus under the acquirer
increases with stakeholder investment more than the surplus under the entrepreneur,
investing more facilitates the takeover, and the loss to the stakeholder in case of a takeover
induces him to invest less rather than more, i.e. takeovers are not disciplinary.
205.2 Financial Constraints and Trade Credit
We now consider the particular case of trade credit. We are not aware of any previous
work on trade credit as an implicit contract, nor on the interactions between takeover
threats and trade credit. However, trade credit is essentially a sequence of short-term
credit contracts that the supplier extends to his client in potentially long term relation-
ships. Such long-term relationships imply that the supplier may be willing to trade at
favorable terms to the ￿rm when this can improve the surplus created in the long run. In
particular, when the ￿rm faces ￿nancial constraints that could prevent it from taking a
pro￿table project, the supplier may be willing to extend trade credit at attractive terms
in the hope of bene￿ting from part of the value created by the project later on. While
a traditional creditor typically relies on explicit long-term contracts in such scenarios,
and may not be willing to ￿nance a long term project when long-term contracts are not
e￿cient, the supplier may rely on its importance in creating value by supplying essential
input to extract rents at a later stage. This makes a supplier willing to extend trade
credit in cases where traditional creditors would refuse to do so. Therefore, trade credit
may involve an implicit contract component that can be a￿ected by major corporate
decisions such as takeovers.
5.2.1 Bargaining and the Supplier as a Source of Financing
In this section, we modify the model as follows. First, the project requires an initial
investment K that requires ￿nancing from the stakeholder/supplier. Second, the return
R is now assumed to be a function of the entrepreneur’s investment, I. In other words,
the initial capital K available to the entrepreneur is assumed to include the funds that
can be raised from traditional creditors. We argue that when the supplier’s bargaining
power increases, a higher supplier’s investment may come at the expense of the entre-
preneur’s incentive to invest, and we examine the relationship between trade credit and
the possibility of takeovers.20
20All proofs in this section are ommitted because they are very similar to those in the previous sections.
21We ￿rst examine how this variation on the ￿rst model a￿ects the analysis with-
out takeovers. After signing the initial contract with the supplier, the entrepreneur’s
incentive to invest increases with p. However, her actual investment must satisfy the
budget constraint I ￿ K ￿ w1 = K ￿ w0 + (1 ￿ p)f(I) which becomes tighter when p
increases. The di￿erence w1 ￿ w0 can then be interpreted as trade credit. When she
cannot commit to invest at the beginning of the game, the entrepreneur chooses I so as
to maximize pf(I) ￿ I under the constraint I ￿ K ￿ w0 + (1 ￿ p)f(I), which implies
I = minff0￿1(1=p);K ￿ w0 + (1 ￿ p)f(I)g. Hence, there are costs and bene￿ts for the
entrepreneur and the suppliers of having a high bargaining power:
Corollary 1 : The higher the supplier’s bargaining power, the higher the amount of
trade credit that he is willing to extend, and the lower the initial capital K that the
entrepreneur needs to take the project, but the lower her incentive to invest when choosing
I.
The ￿exibility o￿ered by having a powerful supplier has many other advantages,
including avoiding bankruptcy. This can be obtained in a setting in which the supplier
can obtain a rent from w1 +w2, and a shortfall at the end of stage 1 can be ￿nanced by
the supplier. Bankruptcy will occur unless the supplier"s rent if he ￿nances the shortfall,
w2 ￿w0 = (1￿p)f(I), is higher than the cost of ￿nancing the shortfall. This will be the
case if the supplier’s bargaining power is large enough.
5.2.2 Takeovers and Trade Credit
This section studies how the possibility of takeovers may a￿ect our analysis. When
the entrepreneur is not ￿nancially constrained, a takeover increases the entrepreneur’s
marginal reward of investment and it is desirable. When the entrepreneur is ￿nancially
constrained, we obtain:
Corollary 2 : A takeover increases the entrepreneur’s incentive to invest. The threat
of a takeover that would lead to a loss to the supplier restricts the amount of trade credit
22that he is willing to extend and it tightens the entrepreneur’s budget constraint. When
the stakeholder is expected to gain from the takeover, there is a hold-up problem from the
acquirer’s viewpoint, and value-increasing takeovers may not take place.
When I is ￿nancially constrained, the supplier’s expectation to lose from the takeover
reduces his willingness to invest in the relationship, and hence it tightens the entrepre-
neur’s budget constraint. But if the supplier expects to bene￿t from the takeover, the
expected takeover will increase his willingness to extend trade credit. Overall, the sup-
plier is better o￿ extending trade credit to ￿nance an investment allowing the takeover
when he expects to bene￿t from the takeover, but he will strategically refuse to extend
trade credit to ensure that the actual investment will not entail a takeover if the takeover
hurts him. In this latter case, the possibility of a takeover decreases actual investment.
5.2.3 Empirical Predictions
The wealth transfer hypothesis and the value creation hypothesis may well be easier
to test in vertical relationships, and more particularly trade credit, than in industrial
relations, where so many possible contingencies may be observed. Direct evidence on
the e￿ect of takeovers on vertical relationships is di￿cult to track down directly because
most input prices in long-term relationships are generally di￿cult to obtain. However,
it is possible to examine both the stock price reaction of (closely) vertically related ￿rms
and the terms of trade credit after the announcement of a takeover. Trade credit has
been surprisingly overlooked in the literature on takeovers and stakeholders. However,
short-term trade credit (which is often rolled over) is a signi￿cant feature of long-term
relationships with trading partners. We believe that trade credit is part of the compen-
sation of a supplier, which typically includes the price for the input plus any pro￿t/loss
that is generated by the trade credit that he extends to the ￿rm. Prices for input are
di￿cult to observe. In contrast, features of trade credit are either easily available, e.g.
through accounts payable or accounts receivables in balance sheets, or may be made
available at a cost, e.g. the interest rate charged and the grace period o￿ered.
23Although we are not aware of any work that includes both takeovers and trade credit,
existing empirical evidence on trade credit may provide partial support to discuss the
empirical relevance of our model. For instance, Petersen and Rajan (1997) ￿nd that
￿nancially constrained ￿rms use more trade credit than others. More speci￿cally, ￿rms in
￿nancial distress appear to increase trade credit compared to other forms of debt (Rajan
and Zingales, 1995, and Franks and Sussman, 2002). This indicates that suppliers keep
￿nancing ￿nancially-constrained ￿rms even when ￿nancial intermediaries do not. One
reason for this may be that suppliers expect to bene￿t from their future interactions with
the ￿rm in a way that ￿nancial intermediaries cannot. The reason for this may be that
the supplier expects to bene￿t from future negotiations through further input supply.
Our analysis further suggests that the terms of trade credit would improve after the ￿rm
emerges from ￿nancial distress.
Furthermore, viewing trade credit as an implicit contract suggests that ￿rms are
expected to use more trade credit as i) their market power and ii) the length and iii)
the speci￿city of their trade relationships increase: Firms facing more intense and more
frequent competition are more subject to the constraints associated with spot markets,
which restricts their ability to bene￿t from informal long-term relationships. This in
turn restricts the value of short-term trade credit as an implicit contract.
The only existing empirical study that we are aware of that overlaps with our view of
the interactions between trade credit and takeovers is Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) ￿nding
that ￿rms use more trade credit in Japan and in Germany, where cross-shareholdings
are observed more often, than in the US and the UK, where the market for corporate
control is more active. This appears to be broadly consistent with our results. Beyond
this international comparison that is prone to a variety of other possible hypotheses, our
analysis suggests that suppliers who have blocks of shares in ￿rms are more likely to
extend trade credit, and at better terms than other suppliers.
We also predict that following a takeover targets may see a change in the level and
the terms (e.g. the interest rates and the grace period) of trade credit. The direction of
24such e￿ects would help to distinguish the implicit contracts hypothesis from the value
creation hypothesis. For instance, the implicit contracts theory suggests that takeover
targets have trade credit at more unfavorable terms than other ￿rms before the takeover
and that these terms improve after the takeover. The value creation hypothesis suggests
that takeover targets see the terms of trade credit improve after the takeover, but that
these terms are not necessarily unfavorable before the takeover.
If one pattern emerges clearly, it can help to extend the analysis of the real e￿ects
of takeover activity to predictions on the attributes of the ￿rms that are more likely to
become takeover targets. Existing empirical work focuses on what happens to stake-
holders of the ￿rms that do become targets, but it is generally silent on what are the
characteristics of likely targets. This is undoubtedly an exciting challenge for future
research.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper pointed out that the threat of a takeover leading to a reduction in the
compensation to stakeholders reduces stakeholders’ investment, which, in turn, tightens
the ￿rm’s ￿nancing constraint. The most e￿cient takeover defence mechanisms would
allow all value-increasing takeovers while prohibiting any potential wealth transfers ex
ante. Blocks of shares or veto power, by giving a stakeholder the power to block a
takeover, would provide the best possible takeover defence mechanisms. By prohibiting
wealth transfers, they actually increase stakeholder’s investment, ￿nancially constrained
investment, pro￿ts and shareholder wealth. However, this comes at the cost of preventing
value-increasing takeovers, and reinforces the hold-up problem created by the fact that
stakeholders appropriate a fraction of the increase in value while the bidder bears the
full costs of his takeover. Ex ante, takeover defence mechanisms increase the investment
from the stakeholder and relaxes the ￿rm’s budget constraint, but they decrease the
shareholder’s incentive to invest.
In our model, an appropriate takeover defence mechanism should provide the stake-
25holders with a guarantee that they will not be expropriated from the revenues of their
e￿ort and while maximizing the probability of value-creating takeovers. When potential
acquirers have di￿erent valuations which are not veri￿able, anti-takeover defences should
be endogenous and therefore implicit. Takeover defence mechanisms can help to sustain
implicit contracts. Written anti-takeover contracts (e.g. poison pills) that increase the
takeover cost are too rigid to satisfy this condition: they cannot allow for all desirable
takeovers and protect implicit contracts at the same time. Giving the stakeholder the
right to reject the takeover (unions’ rights in directory boards in Germany) increases
￿exibility, but this may protect ine￿cient implicit contracts by allowing the stakeholder
to maintain too high his bargaining power. Having the stakeholder own shares in the ￿rm
(e.g. blocks of shares for trading partners, Employee Stock Ownership plans (hereafter
ESOPs) in the US) is an intermediary solution which may enhance the stakeholder’s
bene￿t from a value-increasing takeover, but without guaranteeing him that he will win
for all possible acquirers like in the veto case unless his block can e￿ectively prevent all
takeovers which would transfer wealth from the stakeholder.
We discussed empirical predictions on trade credit associated with our results. Our
analysis leads to testable predictions on other types of stakeholders as well. For instance,
we expect employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to increase wage ￿exibility and to
be used more widely in ￿rms which are subject more heavily to ￿nancial constraints.
We also expect shareholder wealth to be a￿ected positively (resp. negatively) by ESOPs
in ￿rms whose pro￿ts (resp. do not) depend considerably on non-contractible stake-
holders’ investment and whose stakeholders do not (resp. do) have excessive rents.21
Our analysis also suggests that (1) unionization reduces investment more in ￿rms which
are potential takeover targets (partial empirical evidence on this is provided by Bronars
and Deere (1993)) and (2) the decline of unions in the American and British private
21This may help reconcile apparently con￿icting empirical evidence on the e￿ects of ESOPs on share-
holders’ wealth (Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1994, Dhillon and Ramirez, 1994, and Gordon and Pound,
1990). While the ￿rst two papers respectively ￿nd no signi￿cant impact and a positive impact of ESOPs
on shareholder wealth, the third one ￿nds that ESOPs established in the presence of takeover activity
reduced stock prices (by 4%).
26sectors in the past decades may be positively correlated with the development of the
market for corporate control in these countries. In particular, this latter prediction is
entirely consistent with the empirical observation that rates of unionization decreased
in the private sector but increased in the public sector in the US in the 1980s (Lazear’s
symposium (1988)). However, we are not aware of any speci￿c academic work on this
correlation. We predict that a cross-sectional time series analysis would exhibit a pattern
where ￿rms with important implicit contracts (a proxy could be stakeholders’ age) saw
their unions/stakeholders’ bargaining power particularly reduced subsequent to a more
precise takeover threat or a higher takeover activity.
Although our discussion focused on takeovers via a ￿nancial market, our results
would hold with any party which might either take an action which transfers rents
or be replaced by a tougher party at some cost. For instance, a ￿rm may want to
terminate an overfunded de￿ned bene￿t pension plan (Petersen (1992)). Alternatively, a
government which is a priori favorable to stakeholders may see the implicit contracts he
can enter constrained by the possibility of future elections leading to a new conservative
government which is more favorable to shareholders. The incumbent government will
thus need to be tough enough with stakeholders in order to be reelected. The main
points remain valid for other cases such as the e￿ect of other ￿nancial manipulations,
e.g. high leverage, on wage negotiations (Perotti and Spier (1993) and Sarig (1992))22
and vertical relationships.
22In Perotti and Spier, ￿nancial manipulations, used to force the stakeholders to renegotiate their
price, make risk-averse stakeholders bear some risk, which is ine￿cient. The stakeholders’ veto right
would be Pareto-improving since it would make the risk-neutral party bear the risk by preventing the
strategic use of ￿nancial manipulations.
277 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 : We have to prove only that w1 increases with p and that it
is lower than w0.
8p
0 > p; 8e ￿ 0; (1 ￿ p
0)f(e) ￿ e < (1 ￿ p)f(e) ￿ e (8)
This implies that
8p
0 > p; 8e ￿ 0, max
e (1 ￿ p
0)f(e) ￿ e < max
e (1 ￿ p)f(e) ￿ e; (9)
i.e., w1[p0] > w1[p]. 2
Proof of Proposition 2 : A takes over if and only if qf(e) ￿ C > pf(e), that is
C < (q ￿ p)f(e): (10)
The RHS of (10) increases with e. When C is so high that (10) is not satis￿ed for
e = e(p), A never bids and the stakeholder chooses e = e(p) (which decreases with p).
When C 2
h
(q ￿ p)f[q];(q ￿ p)f[p]
￿
, (10) is satis￿ed for e = e(p), but not for e = e(q).
The stakeholder can deter the takeover by exerting a level of e￿ort ^ e 2 [e(q);e(p)] such
that C = (q ￿ p)f(^ e).23 Knowing this, he will choose an e￿ort satisfying
maxfmax
e2[0;^ e]
(1 ￿ p)f(e) ￿ e; max
e2[^ e;e(p)]




(1 ￿ q)f(e) ￿ e ￿ max
e2[0;e(p)]
(1 ￿ q)f(e) ￿ e
= (1 ￿ q)f[q] ￿ e(q)
< (1 ￿ p)f[q] ￿ e(q); (12)
23That ^ e ￿ e(q) comes from the fact that (10) is not satis￿ed for e = e(q).
28the stakeholder anticipates that he always loses from the takeover and he exerts ^ e
in order to prevent it. He expects w2 = w0 + (1 ￿ p)f(^ e) and obtains his stage 1 price





increases with p until
^ e = e(p), and then the e￿ort decreases with p. The prices satisfy
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w1 decreases and w2 increases with p. The entrepreneur’s bargaining power, pt, which
maximizes the stakeholder’s e￿ort, satis￿es (q ￿ pt)f[pt] = C (pt 2 [q;p]).
When C is so low that (10) is satis￿ed for e = e(q), the stakeholder can either choose a
low e￿ort e < e(q) satisfying C = (q￿p)f(e) (the existence of e is ensured by continuity)
so as to prevent the takeover and bargain w2 with E or choose e(q) knowing that A will
take over the ￿rm. He will choose e if and only if
(1 ￿ p)f(e) ￿ e = (1 ￿ p)
C
q ￿ p
￿ e ￿ (1 ￿ q)f[q] ￿ e(q): (16)
It is worthwhile to choose a low e￿ort to prevent the takeover when C is slightly
lower than (q ￿p)f[q]. When C or p are very low, however, the stakeholder chooses e[q]
(which does not vary with p), and A takes over the ￿rm. In addition, it is clear that e
increases with p. 2
Proof of Proposition 4 : Since (3) is ensured by the second part of Proposition 3,
we only have to prove (1) and (2).
(1) Call ￿1 and ￿2 > ￿1 two possible realizations of ~ ￿ in (￿V;￿S) and note Di =
(q ￿ p)￿if(e) with i 2 f1;2g. If the ￿rm sets C > D1, then a value increasing takeover
29is deterred when ￿1 is realized. If C < D2, then the hold-up problem arises when ￿2
is realized. Since D1 is lower than D2, no C can protect implicit contract and allow
value-increasing takeovers.
(2) If the stakeholder has a veto right on the sale of the ￿rm (and C is exogenous),
he refuses any sale reducing his compensation ex post. If ￿(1￿q) ￿ (1￿p), he bene￿ts
from a takeover and will accept it. Otherwise, he accepts the takeover if and only if
he gets a complementary transfer, N, such that N + ￿(1 ￿ q)f(e) ￿ (1 ￿ p)f(e). The
takeover takes place if and only if (￿q ￿ p)f(e) ￿ N ￿ D. 2
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